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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2007, Russia grabbed the world’s attention by sending a 
pair of manned submersibles deep below the polar ice cap to plant a 
Russian flag on the seabed floor at the North Pole.1 The stunt was an 
impressive and daring technical achievement, but carried no legal 
significance.2 It neither bolstered nor confirmed a Russian claim to 
 
* Co-Chair, Law of the Sea Committee, ABA Section of International Law; 
Associate, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP; J.D., Yale Law School, B.A., 
Amherst College. 
 1. C.J. Chivers, Eyeing Future Wealth, Russians Plant the Flag on the Arctic 
Seabed, Below the Polar Cap, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at A8. 
 2. This view is widely-shared. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic? 
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the Arctic seabed. Nor did it constitute a deviation from the rule of 
law. Rather, it signaled Russia’s intention and ability to continue 
pressing a legal claim to a significant portion of the continental shelf 
beneath the Arctic Ocean. 
Nonetheless, Russia’s gambit accelerated a media obsession with 
the Arctic. In the more than two years since Russia’s North Pole 
adventure—and against a backdrop of a retreating polar ice cap and 
rising temperatures3—journalists and scholars have come to describe 
the Arctic’s future in alarmist terms. These reports include warnings 
of “a race for control of the Arctic,”4 and a “coming anarchy” in 
which states will “unilaterally grab” as much territory as possible to 
secure new sources of oil and natural gas.5 Some describe the Arctic 
as the site of “an armed mad dash” and a potential source of a future 
armed conflict, likely involving the United States and Russia.6 This 
troubling picture has generated calls for a new international 
agreement—an “Arctic Treaty”—to provide a comprehensive legal 
 
Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North, 45 POLAR REC. 73, 74-75 
(2009); John B. Bellinger, Treaty On Ice, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A21; The 
Arctic: Drawing Lines in Melting Ice, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2007, at 49, 50. 
 3. See James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest 
Passage, 22 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 257-59 (2007) (remarking that 
during the summer, the amount of sea ice had “declined more dramatically” than 
usual); see also Andrew C. Revkin, Arctic Melt Unnerves the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2007, at F1 (noting that, because the sea ice had dwindled so much, “two 
long-imagined” shipping routes over the Arctic were accessible for a short while). 
 4. Colin Woodward, Who Resolves Arctic Oil Disputes?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Aug. 20, 2007 at 1. 
 5. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown; The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF., March/April 2008, at 63 
[hereinafter Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown]; see also Thomas Omestad, The Race for 
the Arctic, as the Ice Melts, Nations Eye Oil and Gas Deposits and Shipping 
Routes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 2008, at 53 (characterizing the Aortic 
as a “toxic brew” due to its prime location, potential source of natural resources, 
and lack of clear ownership). 
 6. See Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown, supra note 5 (describing the possibility of 
“armed brinkmanship” in response to disputed claims); see also Tony Halpin, 
Russia Warns of War Within a Decade Over Arctic Oil and Gas, TIMES (LONDON), 
May 14, 2009, at 34. Some Russian commentators have appeared willing—if not 
downright eager—to use the Arctic as a foil for nationalist rhetoric. See Keir Giles, 
Looking North, in MARK A. SMITH & KEIR GILES, RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: THE 
“LAST DASH NORTH” 10, 14-15 (Def. Acad. of the U.K., Russian Ser. 07/26, Sept. 
2007). 
AUTHOR CHECK 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010 2:35 PM 
2010] OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT 227 
regime for the region.7 In light of the above, it is easy to see why the 
casual observer would be left thinking that when it comes to the 
Arctic, we are operating in a legal vacuum. 
But that is simply not the case. Indisputably, the Arctic poses 
many challenges, but it is not a twenty-first century incarnation of 
the Wild West. There are institutions and legal frameworks in place 
through which the challenges of Arctic governance and management 
can and should be addressed. As discussed below, the centerpiece of 
that framework is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or “Convention”).8 Moreover, within the 
existing governance structure, Russia’s track record with respect to 
the Arctic—perhaps in contrast to Russia’s recent record 
elsewhere—has arguably been more positive than not. As such, 
rather than fixating on the Arctic as a flashpoint for confrontation, it 
may be more useful to consider the Arctic as an opportunity for 
constructive engagement. 
I. DEVELOPING THE “RULE OF LAW” IN THE 
ARCTIC DEMANDS STRENGTHENING THE 
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK, NOT A NEW 
“ARCTIC TREATY” 
There should be no serious debate that the Arctic climate is 
undergoing dramatic change. The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) 
reports that “in the past 30 years, average temperatures in the Arctic 
have increased at almost twice the rate of the planet as a whole.”9 
 
 7. See Donald R. Rothwell, The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a 
New Regime?, AUSTL. NAT’L. UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, Res. Paper No. 08-37, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1314546; Scott Borgerson, Op-Ed., An Ice-
Cold War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A19 [hereinafter Borgerson, An Ice-Cold 
War]; see also ROBERT HUEBERT & BROOKS B. YEAGER, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND 
[WWF], A NEW SEA: THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON MANAGEMENT 
AND CONSERVATION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT 24 (2008) 
(emphasizing the need for a “an ecosystem approach to management of the Arctic, 
rather than a merely sectoral or problem-based response”). 
 8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 9. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY [USGS], U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROJECT, 
PAST CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC AND AT HIGH LATITUDES 
11 (2009), available at http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap1-2/sap1-2-
final-report-all.pdf. 
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This has resulted in the “substantial retreat and thinning of the Arctic 
sea ice cover.”10 Moreover, the retreat is “accelerating, and it is 
expected to continue. The Arctic Ocean may become seasonally ice 
free as early as 2040.”11 Others predict “an ice-free summer period” 
by 2020,12 or even, extraordinarily, by 2013.13 
These developments pose significant challenges on a global level, 
particularly as melting ice introduces massive quantities of 
freshwater into the oceans and threatens higher sea levels. But most 
discussion of the Arctic focuses on the regional challenges at hand. 
The shrinking polar ice cap sets the stage for increased human 
activity in the region, notably through the development of oil and 
natural gas deposits, the prospect of seasonal or year-round 
commercial shipping, and the exploitation of newly accessible 
fisheries. Each of these developments poses legal and political 
challenges. 
But do these challenges demand Arctic-specific solutions in the 
form of a comprehensive, non-sectoral “Arctic Treaty?” On this 
point, the United States and Russia agree: such a treaty is neither 
necessary nor desirable. In May 2008, representatives of the five 
Arctic coastal states (Canada, Denmark (through Greenland), 
Norway, Russia, and the United States) met in Ilulissat, Greenland to 
underscore that shared understanding: 
The Arctic Ocean stands at the threshold of significant 
changes. Climate change and the melting of ice have a 
potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of 
local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the 
potential exploitation of natural resources.  
 
 
 10. Id. at 418. 
 11. See id. (explaining also that as the sea ice diminishes each year, the Arctic 
will get warmer due to a “feedback mechanism between ice and its reflectivity”). 
 12. See Rosemary Rayfuse, Warm Waters and Cold Shoulders: Jostling for 
Jurisdiction in Polar Oceans 4, (Univ. of New S. Wales Faculty of Law Res. 
Series, Working Paper No. 56, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1402390# (remarking that the estimates for an ice-free 
summer “are constantly being revised downward”). 
 13. Scott Borgerson & Caitlyn Antrim, Op-Ed., An Arctic Circle of Friends, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2009, at A21 (speculating that ice-free summers will lead 
to increases in shipping, fishing, and tourism in the Arctic). 
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. . . Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights 
and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits 
of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine 
environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of 
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the 
sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the 
orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims. 
This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible 
management by the five coastal States and other users of this 
Ocean through national implementation and application of 
relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a 
new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the 
Arctic Ocean.14 
The Ilulissat Declaration clearly rejects the proposal for “a new 
comprehensive legal regime” for the Arctic. But this is not a blow to 
the rule of law (as some suggest). On the contrary, it focuses 
attention on the political and legal mechanisms already in place that 
should be enhanced and applied to Arctic issues. A closer look at 
some of the key components of the existing governance structure 
may help explain why the Arctic states have taken this position, 
despite the very real change taking place. 
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
(“UNCLOS”) 
UNCLOS is the cornerstone of the existing legal framework for 
the Arctic. Sometimes described as a “constitution for the oceans,” 
UNCLOS is “the product of centuries of practice, three U.N. 
Conferences (1958, 1960, and 1973-1982), and a subsequent 
agreement on implementation, negotiated from 1990 to 1994.”15 It is 
widely considered “one of the most comprehensive and well-
established bodies of international law in existence [and] . . . is 
critical to creating a more secure international environment.”16  
 
 14. The Ilulissat Declaration, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ., Arctic Ocean Conf., 
Ilulissat, Greenland, May 29, 2008, available at http://arctic-council.org/file 
archive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf. 
 15. SCOTT G. BORGERSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 6 (2009). 
 16. See Devon Chaffee, Freedom or Force on the High Seas?: Arms 
Interdiction and International Law, SCI. DEMOCRATIC ACTION, June 2004, at 1, 2. 
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UNCLOS is wide-ranging in scope and attempts to strike a careful 
balance between the “exclusive” right of coastal States to control 
their marine resources and an “inclusive” freedom of the seas to 
which all states are entitled.17 On the one hand, UNCLOS codifies a 
12 nautical mile (“nm”) territorial sea,18 a contiguous zone extending 
24 nm from the coastline,19 and an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(“EEZ”) extending 200 nm from the coastline20—maritime zones in 
which the coastal State wields substantial regulatory authority (and 
complete sovereignty with respect to the territorial sea). On the other 
hand, UNCLOS carefully preserves the traditional freedoms (e.g., 
navigation and other uses) of the high seas21—those waters beyond 
the EEZ—and codifies the concepts of “innocent passage” through 
the territorial sea,22 and “transit passage” through international 
straits.23 The Convention sets forth a framework for the development 
of more specific measures aimed at the shared management of living 
marine resources24 and the prevention and reduction of marine 
pollution.25 It also provides a “menu” of options for the resolution of 
oceans-related disputes.26 All of these provisions are relevant to the 
Arctic. 
In particular, Article 76 of UNCLOS creates a system under which 
coastal states can acquire exclusive rights to the exploitation of 
defined sections of the ocean floor. Specifically, Article 76 defines 
the continental shelf, provides geological criteria relevant to 
establishing its outer limits beyond 200 nm from the coastline (up to 
the 350 nm limit), and creates an independent commission charged 
with reviewing and endorsing those claims.27 This means that coastal 
states have exclusive rights to explore and exploit the natural 
 
 17. Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of 
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 131, 167-75 
(2005) (remarking that changes in the ways in which states manage their resources 
has somewhat “qualified” the freedoms traditionally enjoyed on the high seas). 
 18. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3. 
 19. Id. art. 33. 
 20. Id. art. 57. 
 21. Id. art. 87. 
 22. Id. art. 17. 
 23. Id. art. 38. 
 24. Id. arts. 117-119. 
 25. Id. arts. 192-237. 
 26. Id. arts. 279-299. 
 27. Id. art. 76. 
AUTHOR CHECK 1 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010 2:35 PM 
2010] OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT 231 
resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) of their continental shelves up to 
at least 200 nm from the coastline (corresponding to the limit of the 
EEZ), but also allows states to claim an “extended continental shelf” 
beyond the 200 nm limit if they can adduce sufficient scientific 
evidence of the shelf’s continuation.28 A state must submit its 
application, including the relevant scientific data, within ten years of 
joining the Convention. It is largely this possibility—the right to 
claim an extended continental shelf—that underlies the media frenzy 
over the “scramble” to establish Arctic claims. 
UNCLOS does not address the Arctic by name. It does, however, 
include a provision on “Ice-Covered Areas.” Article 234 provides as 
follows: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic 
zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the 
presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year 
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm 
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such 
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
based on the best available scientific evidence.29 
At some point, Article 234 may no longer apply to the Arctic if 
climate change results in a region that is no longer “ice-covered.”30 
But until that time arrives—and probably for a significant time yet—
Article 234 provides the Arctic coastal States with significant leeway 
to regulate the use of Arctic waters within their EEZs on a non-
discriminatory basis. That said, Article 234 does not provide any 
basis for regulation of the high seas that lie beyond the EEZs of the 
 
 28. Id. art. 77; see also David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2003) 
(extensively discussing the continental shelf provisions, including the difficulty of 
reconciling legal and geological approaches to the concept). 
 29. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 234. As will be discussed, Canada and Russia 
have availed themselves of this provision to regulate Arctic shipping lanes. 
 30. See Rayfuse, supra note 12 (hypothesizing that there will be debates about 
the terms and phrases in Article 234, which could question its applicability). 
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circumpolar states—waters which may become largely ice-free and 
fully navigable. 
There are currently 160 parties to UNCLOS, including four of the 
five Arctic coastal states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia 
(which joined in 1997).31 As of 2009, the United States had not yet 
acceded to the Convention, despite extensive and bipartisan support 
for it to do so.32 And while the United States bestows the status of 
customary international law on most UNCLOS provisions,33 the 
failure of the United States to accede to the treaty has deprived it of a 
“seat at the table when the rights that are vital to [U.S.] interests are 
debated and interpreted.”34 Non-party status precludes the United 
States from submitting an application for the recognition of any 
extended continental shelf it may be able to claim in the Arctic. 
Indeed, to the extent the United States is concerned about the 
adherence of Russia or any other country to the laws and norms that 
 
 31. See U.N. Div. for Ocean Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists 
of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related 
Agreements as at 06 November 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#TheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawo
ftheSea (last visited Dec. 3, 2009). 
 32. See Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 43 INT’L LAW. 915, 
915-16 (2009). For the last fifteen years, a small but vocal opposition—armed with 
flawed arguments—has prevented UNCLOS from receiving a full vote by the 
United States Senate. See David J. Bederman, The Old Isolationism and the New 
Law of the Sea: Reflections on Advice and Consent for UNCLOS, 49 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. ONLINE 21, 24 (2008), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/126 (pointing out that 
opponents to UNCLOS rely on the weak argument that the provisions already exist 
under customary international law ); William L. Schachte, Jr., The Unvarnished 
Truth: The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention, 61 NAVAL WAR C. R. 119 
(2008) (discussing the various and unpersuasive arguments against ratification, and 
also pointing out that the initial—and only—objections raised by the Reagan 
Administration to certain UNCLOS provisions relating to deep-sea mining were 
satisfactorily resolved by the subsequent Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 41). 
 33. See Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 378, 378–79 
(Mar. 10, 1983) (recognizing the necessity of navigation and overflight provisions 
and declaring a 200 mile EEZ). 
 34. Statement on Advancement of United States Maritime Interests, 43 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 635 (May 15, 2007); see also John B. Bellinger III, 
U.S. Dept. of St., The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention 3 (Law of 
the Sea Inst. Occasional Paper No. 5, 2008) (asserting that the United States “has 
an enormous stake” in the UNCLOS provisions and would have benefited by 
exerting “a level of influence commensurate with [its] interests”). 
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apply to the Arctic, the United States would considerably strengthen 
its position by swiftly acceding to the Convention.  
B. ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARCTIC 
Several other agreements and institutions supplement the 
UNCLOS framework and have direct application to the Arctic. A 
non-exhaustive list includes: 
• The Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North East Atlantic;35 
• The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (the “Fish Stocks Agreement”);36 
• The International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol 
of 1978;37 
• The International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea;38 
• The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;39 
and 
 
 35. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic, 32 I.L.M. 1072 (1992). 
 36. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement]. 
 37. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 
2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61. 
 38. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 
U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278. 
 39. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-5, 
1673 U.N.T.S. 57. 
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• The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants.40 
In addition, two institutions require mention here: the International 
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) and the Arctic Council. 
The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Its 
mandate concerns the development and maintenance of a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. This includes the 
promulgation of rules and regulations relating to ship safety and the 
effect of shipping on the maritime environment. While not focused 
exclusively on the Arctic, the IMO develops rules and standards that 
have both general and specific application to the region. In particular, 
the IMO has developed guidelines for ships operating in ice-covered 
waters (the so-called “Polar Code”).41 These guidelines—which are 
currently only recommendatory—apply to the construction, 
equipment, and operation of vessels navigating in the Arctic.42  
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as a high level 
intergovernmental forum for coordination among the Arctic states 
and indigenous Arctic populations. Its focus has historically been 
sustainable development and environmental protection. It is a “soft 
law” body that serves an advisory function, but the organization—
which includes the United States and Russia as active participants—
has successfully raised the profile of Arctic issues and facilitated a 
science-based, depoliticized approach to developing environmental 
policy   for   the   region.43  For   example,   it  has  issued  extensive 
 
 
 
 40. United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532. 
 41. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters, MSC/Circ.1056 (Dec. 23, 2002), available at http://www.imo.org 
/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D6629/1056-MEPC-Circ399.pdf. 
 42. See ØYSTEIN JENSEN, FRIDTJOF NANSENS INST. [FNI], THE IMO 
GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS OPERATING IN ICE-COVERED WATERS: FROM VOLUNTARY 
TO MANDATORY TOOL FOR NAVIGATION SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION?, at v (2007), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R0207.pdf 
(noting that the guidelines are designed to address the risks associated with 
navigating the Arctic’s international shipping routes). 
 43. See Young, supra note 2, at 79 (recognizing that including non-state actors 
in discussions about policy is key to the Council’s achievements). 
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guidelines on offshore oil and gas activities.44 It has also provided 
recommendations to improve the safety of shipping in the region.45 
Indeed, the Arctic Council occupies a critical role in developing 
policy and best practices for the region; this contribution should not 
be undervalued.46 Whether or not a comprehensive treaty for the 
Arctic is desirable, it would undoubtedly face enormous—even 
insurmountable—political obstacles. As such, the Arctic Council 
holds greater potential to play an increasingly important role in 
efforts to improve Arctic governance by promoting the 
harmonization of national laws and regulations, a strategy that may 
be more effective than the promotion of comprehensive “top-down” 
solutions by treaty. At the same time, the Arctic Council can seek to 
ensure that international institutions in a position to effect 
widespread reforms—such as the IMO—are “well informed about 
conditions prevailing in the Arctic.”47  
In sum, UNCLOS and a wide range of complementary 
international agreements and organizations provide a legal 
framework for the issues we face—or soon will face—in the Arctic. 
That is not to say the existing framework provides clear or robust 
rules for every situation. Nor can it guarantee that any state—Russia, 
the United States, or any other—will always conduct itself in a 
manner that lives up to international standards. But the framework 
provides an adequate starting point, and it should also remind us that 
“new” challenges facing the Arctic are not necessarily unique or 
unfamiliar. Many of these issues—from drawing maritime borders to 
promoting  safe  navigation  to protecting the marine environment— 
 
 
 44. ARCTIC COUNCIL, PROTECTION OF THE ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T WORKING 
GROUP, ARCTIC OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES (2009), available at 
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/ArcticOffhsoreOilandGasGuidelines2009.pdf. 
 45. These recommendations provide the substance of a bill that was introduced 
in the U.S. Senate in August 2009—the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
Implementation Act of 2009, S. 1514, 111th Cong. (2009). See Sen. Lisa 
Murkowski, Op-Ed., Arctic Holds Both Promise and Challenges, 
JUNEAUEMPIRE.COM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/ 
082009/opi_483649495.shtml (remarking that the Act was intended to enable the 
United States to tackle the challenges presented by the Arctic). 
 46. See Young, supra note 2, at 79 (acknowledging that the Council has 
elevated Arctic concerns to a global level, with particular emphasis on pollution). 
 47. Id. at 81. 
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are quintessential law of the sea issues to which international 
policymakers bring a wealth of experience.  
II. APPLYING THE EXISTING LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK TO THE CHALLENGES FACING 
THE ARCTIC 
As noted above, three of the principal ways in which melting ice 
will give way to increased human activity in the Arctic are through 
oil and natural gas recovery, commercial shipping, and fishing. This 
section will briefly discuss the application of the existing legal 
framework to those challenges. 
A. HYDROCARBON EXPLOITATION 
In an energy-driven world, the prospect of extensive and 
undiscovered hydrocarbon deposits has fueled the current focus on 
the Arctic. USGS scientists estimate that the Arctic contains 
conventional oil and gas resources totaling approximately 90 billion 
barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion 
barrels of natural gas liquids.48 This could amount to “just over a fifth 
of the world’s undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural-gas 
resources.”49 These numbers highlight the importance of the 
UNCLOS provisions that govern the exploitation of resources in the 
continental shelf and beyond. By reaching agreements with 
neighboring states as to the delimitation of its continental shelf 
within the 200 nm limit50—and by “certifying” claims to the 
extended continental shelf beyond that limit with the Commission on 
Limits of the Continental Shelf (“Commission”)—each Arctic 
coastal   state   can   secure   legal   certainty   over   the  scope  of  its 
 
 
 48. USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil 
and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049 (2008), available 
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/. 
 49. Stephen Power, Bush Moves to Update U.S. Policy in Arctic Region, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 8, 2009. 
 50. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 83 (“The delimitation of the continental 
shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable 
solution.”). 
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jurisdiction. This is a prerequisite to resource recovery projects that 
require massive amounts of public and private investment.51 
In accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 76 of 
UNCLOS, Russia and Norway have already submitted extended 
shelf claims to the Commission.52 In 2001, Russia made the first such 
application, which included a claim to the Lomonosov Ridge, a 
1,240-mile undersea mountain chain extending from the Russian 
coast to the North Pole and beyond.53 The claim sought to add nearly 
one million square kilometers to Russia’s arctic territory.54 Other 
states, including the United States, objected to that application on the 
merits.55 A year later, the Commission recommended that Russia 
make a revised submission based on additional scientific evidence.56 
Significantly, Russia accepted the Commission’s ruling and is in the 
process of developing a stronger submission through the collection 
and analysis of additional evidence from the ocean floor. Elsewhere, 
submissions from Denmark and Canada are expected in the coming 
years. The United States—which, like its Arctic neighbors, is busily 
mapping the ocean floor to compile the necessary data for its own 
 
 51. See Richard R. Burgess, The New Cold War? Melting of Ice Spurs 
Maritime Activity as Nations Rush to Stake Claims for Potential Arctic Resources, 
SEAPOWER, Oct. 2007, at 14 (observing that oil companies need “security of 
tenure” before financing and insuring continental shelf investments). 
 52. Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by 
the Russian Federation, Ref. No. CLCS 01.2001.LOS (Dec. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm; 
Comm'n on the Limits of the Cont'l Shelf (CLCS), Outer Limits of the Continental 
Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Baselines: Submission by the Kingdom 
of Norway, Ref. No. CLCS.07.2006.LOS (Nov. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm. 
 53. Id. at 15. 
 54. David Malakoff, Nations Look For an Edge in Claiming Continental 
Shelves, 298 SCIENCE 1877 (2002). 
 55. See United States of America: Notification Regarding the Submission Made 
by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, U.N. Ref. CLCS.01.2001.LOS/USA (Mar. 18, 2002) (including a letter from 
Ambassador John D. Negroponte to U.N. Under-Secretary General for Legal 
Affairs Hans Corell, in which the Ambassador raised questions about the 
differences between Russia’s scientific data and other data in the scientific 
community). 
 56. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 41, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/57/Add.1 (Oct. 8, 2002) 
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claim—cannot submit an application to the Commission until it 
accedes to UNCLOS.57 
For purposes of this assessment, however, the crucial point is that 
mechanisms exist for the peaceful establishment of these claims 
through the submission of scientific evidence to the Commission.58 
And the Arctic states, including Russia, have been following the 
rules of the game, and, in some instances, working together to 
develop the necessary scientific data.59 It is important to keep in 
mind that while these claims may implicate very large tracts of 
territory (as Russia’s initial application certainly did), there is 
nothing inherently illegitimate about such claims; the extent of “the 
submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State” and 
“the slope and the rise” of “the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf” does 
not command a pari passu distribution of continental shelf among 
the Arctic states.60 In brief, some states’ shelves may simply be 
bigger than others. This outcome could be entirely consistent with 
the rule of law. 
While there are legitimate reasons to be concerned that the 
Commission is overworked and understaffed, there is currently no 
indication that any country, Russia included, is prepared to charge 
ahead with an Arctic claim that has not received the Commission’s 
 
 57. See The Scramble for the Seabed: Suddenly, a Wider World Below the 
Waterline, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2009, at 35 (noting that any country that ratified 
the treaty prior to May 1999 has ten years from the date of ratification to submit a 
claim for extension of their continental shelf beyond the normal 200 nm 
extension). 
 58. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 279 (“States Parties shall settle any 
dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention by peaceful means.”); but see, e.g., Rayfuse, supra note 12, at 6 
(arguing that there are legitimate concerns that the existing legal framework may 
lack sufficient provisions “for coordinating activities occurring between the high 
seas water column and the extended continental shelf”). 
 59. See Bellinger, supra note 2 (observing that Russia has complied with 
international law as it maps its extended continental shelf); see also MINISTER OF 
INDIAN AFF. & N. DEV., GOV’T OF CAN., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR 
NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR FUTURE 12 (2009), available at http://www.northern 
strategy.ca/cns/cns.pdf, at 12 [hereinafter CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY] 
(describing the process as “not a race,” but rather a “collaborative process based on 
a shared commitment to international law” in which Canada, Denmark, Russia, and 
the United States are working together). 
 60. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 76(3). 
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approval.61 Consistent with that view, it has emerged that February 
2009 talks between Canada and Russia included discussion of a 
potential joint submission from Canada, Denmark, and Russia to the 
Commission.62 Such an application would not determine competing 
claims among the three countries, but would allow for demarcation 
of the area under the control of those coastal states from the area 
beyond. Furthermore, the collaboration required to produce a joint 
submission could itself be a valuable confidence-building measure 
that would defuse nascent disagreements over exactly where final 
borders should be drawn. 
Indeed, there is a premium on cooperation among the circumpolar 
states when it comes to hydrocarbons. Without efforts to reach 
negotiated settlements, it may be very difficult to secure the 
investment that resource recovery in the region will require.63 And 
the international approbation that would accompany an act of 
unilateral annexation of the Arctic continental shelf would likely not 
be worth the prize. A large percentage of the hydrocarbon deposits in 
the Arctic—and those which are probably most feasible to 
capture64—are located within the 200 nm of continental shelf over 
which, for the most part, the littoral states already exercise 
jurisdiction and effective control.65 
 
 61. It bears mention that even if a state sought to assert unilateral control, doing 
so would likely be easier said than done in the difficult Arctic conditions. And 
while Russia has a significant advantage over the United States in terms of Arctic 
infrastructure (most notably, a much larger fleet of icebreakers), the assertion of 
control through military force is difficult to imagine at this juncture. See generally 
Oleg Bukharin, Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet, 14 SCI. & GLOBAL SECURITY 
25 (2006) (discussing the power of the Russian icebreaker fleet, and noting 
Russia’s plans for expansion of the icebreaker program). 
 62. Randy Boswell, Thaw May Be Underway in Ottawa-Moscow Arctic Issues, 
CANWEST NEWS SERV., May 12, 2009, http://www.canada.com/technology/Thaw+ 
underway+Ottawa+Moscow+Arctic+issues/1589395/story.html (last visited Dec. 
4, 2009). 
 63. See Burgess, supra note 51, at 14 (“Determining the sovereignty of a 
section of continental shelf bears directly on the economics of resource 
exploration.”) 
 64. See McKenzie Funk, Arctic Landgrab, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, May 2009, at 
2 (detailing the high expenses and danger associated with the initial journey of the 
Mir I and Mir II, two privately-funded Russian submersibles initially sent to the 
bottom of the North Pole). 
 65. See Borgerson & Antrim, supra note 13, at A21 (remarking that any oil or 
mineral fields found at the lower depths outside of countries’ EEZs would be 
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B. COMMERCIAL SHIPPING 
The prospect of seasonal or even year-round commercial shipping 
in the Arctic poses a different challenge. Some fear that if, or when, 
Arctic shipping routes become commercially feasible, significant 
environmental degradation will inevitably follow. Indeed, the 
Arctic’s marine environment may be especially susceptible to the 
pollution caused by regular vessel traffic. The economist Robert 
Wade has set the risks against the potential gains in the following 
terms: 
Shipping poses dangers to the ecosystem of the Arctic, which 
is even more vulnerable than more southerly environments. 
The biggest danger is from accidents, because oil and other 
organic substances decompose more slowly in cold water and 
ice, and ice can interfere with clean-up. Also, emissions from 
fossil-fuelled vessels may cause greying of the ice cap, 
accelerating melting. On the other hand, shorter shipping 
routes could significantly cut fuel consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions, especially if engines use hydrogen 
or nuclear fuel . . . .66 
Historically, there have been two potential sea routes connecting 
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Arctic: the Northwest 
Passage, a series of straits and channels “through the northern tier of 
the North American continent,”67 and the Northern Sea Route along 
Russia’s northern coast. Compared to routes through the Panama 
Canal or the Suez, these routes reduce the journeys between New 
York and Tokyo or between Shanghai and Rotterdam by thousands 
of miles.68 
 
 
prohibitively expensive to extract). 
 66. Robert Wade, A Warmer Arctic Ocean Needs Shipp Rules, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c415b68-c374-11dc-b083-
0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1. 
 67. Kraska, supra note 3, at 258. 
 68. Id.; see also Wade, supra note 66 (highlighting distance and security as two 
benefits to opening the northern shipping route); Erik Kirschbaum, Climate 
Change Opens Arctic Route for German Ships, REUTERS, Aug. 21, 2009, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-BusinessofGreen/idUSTRE57K53Z20090 
821 (commenting on the savings in fuel costs and emissions that would result from 
using the Northern Route). 
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Russia has made limited use of the Northern Sea Route over the 
past century, in large part to support remote Siberian outposts—and 
only to the extent that ice-breakers made such transit possible. But an 
Arctic shipping infrastructure exists, and the Soviet Union “gradually 
developed the entire Northern Sea Route as an internal waterway, in 
support of the industrial development of Arctic resources.”69 
However, in the post-Soviet era, the route’s commercial use has 
remained highly limited; there is still significant ice blockage during 
much of the year and Russia, until 2009, had not approved transit 
through the Northern Sea Route by any non-Russian commercial 
vessel. Significantly, in August 2009, two German-owned ships, 
Beluga Fraternity and Beluga Foresight, undertook and completed 
the voyage, with Russian approval and without ice-breaker 
assistance.70  
This suggests an important evolution in the development of 
Russian law and regulation pertaining to commercial use of the sea 
route, but it is unknown at the time of writing whether or how Russia 
applied its traditional transit requirements to the Beluga vessels. 
Under the auspices of Article 234 of UNCLOS, Russia has 
traditionally required its own commercial vessels to pay a tariff and 
accept government escorts and ice-breaker assistance on the ground 
that the continuous presence of ice creates a safety hazard to 
vessels.71 As a result, the operational, political, and commercial risks 
of regular transit through the Northern Sea Route have prevented the 
international shipping industry from seizing the long-awaited 
opportunity to exploit an Arctic “short-cut” between East and West. 
Accordingly, the voyage undertaken by the Beluga vessels marks an 
important transition. 
By comparison, the Northwest Passage has historically been non-
navigable (with a few limited exceptions).72 It is not yet subject to 
 
 69. Claes Lykke Ragner, ‘Den Norra Sjövägen’ [The Northern Sea Route] in 
BARENTS – ETT GRÄNSLAND I NORDEN (Torsten Hallberg ed., 2008). 
 70. Kirschbaum, supra note 68; German Ships Successfully Make “Arctic 
Passage,” REUTERS, Sept. 12, 2009. 
 71. Ragner, supra note 69 (noting that Russia regulations require ships crossing 
through its EEZ to notify the Russian authorities of the voyage, apply for an ice-
breaker to guide them along the route, and also pay an “ice-breaker fee”). 
 72. See Kraska, supra note 67, at 263-66 (stating that in 1969 an American 
vessel—accompanied by U.S. Coast Guard ice-breakers and without Canada’s 
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regular transit by commercial shipping vessels, but that situation 
appears to be changing. The passage was identified as “ice free” for 
the first time in 2007.73 It became ice-free again in 2008 and saw its 
first recorded commercial voyage.74 But the Northwest Passage lies 
at the center of a long simmering legal dispute between Canada on 
one side, and the United States and the European Union on the other. 
Canada contends that the Northwest Passage constitutes “internal 
waters” and is fully subject to Canadian sovereignty. The United 
States and the European Union deem the waterway an “international 
strait” subject to the regime of “transit passage” established by 
UNCLOS.75 Whether under a theory of “internal waters” or pursuant 
to Article 234 of UNCLOS, Canada imposes stringent environmental 
standards on ships crossing Arctic waters within its EEZ and is 
seeking to require those ships to report to Canadian authorities.76 
In the abstract, Russian and Canadian efforts to impose tighter 
restrictions on vessel traffic through these waterways seem sensible; 
there are unique navigational dangers to traversing ice-covered 
waters. The underlying question is whether these measures are 
motivated predominantly by concern for the safety of seafarers and 
the polar environment, or instead are a pretext for nationalistic 
posturing and geopolitical brinksmanship. Under either scenario, are 
these measures at some level contrary to the rule of law? Some 
 
permission—passed through the Northwest Passage, sparking the modern 
disagreement over the passage’s legal status). 
 73. John Roach, Arctic Melt Opens Northwest Passage, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
NEWS, Sept. 17, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/38614724.html 
(last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
 74. 1st Commercial Ship Sails Through Northwest Passage, CBCNEWS.COM, 
Nov. 28, 2008, www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/11/28/nwest-vessel.html (last 
visited Dec. 4, 2009) (explaining that the passage opened much sooner than 
scientists had predicted). 
 75. See generally Kraska, supra note 3, at 275 (arguing that UNCLOS does not 
support Canada’s “excessive” claims to the passage). 
 76. Canadian regulation over its Arctic waters long predates Canada’s 2003 
accession to UNCLOS. The seminal statute is the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1971, which has since been amended to enhance and strengthen 
Canada’s regulatory presence. The Canada Shipping Act of 2001 now requires 
vessels transiting Arctic waters to report to the Canadian Coast Guard. See 
CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY, supra note 59, at 11-12; Canada Requires Ship 
Registration in Arctic, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/26429116/ns/world_news-americas/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (stating that 
previously registration with Canadian authorities had been voluntary). 
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exercise of non-discriminatory, science-based regulation pursuant to 
Article 234 is consistent with the UNCLOS framework, but claims to 
national sovereignty over the waterways—i.e., declarations that such 
waterways constitute historic “internal waterways”—are excessive. It 
would be interesting to see how Russian and Canadian authorities 
will react if current regulations are challenged. Would national or 
international courts deem those regulations consistent with either 
country’s international obligations under UNCLOS? 
That said, disagreements stemming from access to and utilization 
of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are disputes 
that are more appropriate for negotiation than litigation;77 neither 
disagreement is likely to result in a serious escalation.78 And if the 
ultimate interest is safe and clean commercial shipping for the 
benefit of all states, Arctic and non-Arctic alike, tough but 
reasonable standards will serve the community interest. As Professor 
James Kraska of the Naval War College has forcefully argued with 
respect to the Northwest Passage, “[t]he outcome of the debate may 
not be as critical as some would believe, since acceptance of the 
passage as an international strait would permit Canada to seek 
development of internationally accepted standards for protecting the 
strait at the [IMO].”79 Similar arguments can be made with respect to 
the Northern Sea Route, although the waterway, strictly speaking, is 
not an international strait. The key factor is that the IMO is already 
 
 77. See, e.g., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY, supra note 59, at 13 
(describing the U.S.-Canada dispute over the Northwest Passage as “well-
managed,” posing “no sovereignty or defense challenges for Canada,” and, 
furthermore, having “no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and 
cooperatively” with its Arctic neighbors). 
 78. However, the prospect of Canada and Russia backing each other’s 
positions—aligned against the United States and the European Union on this 
issue—may complicate the discussions. But it is unlikely that the United States 
would accept the argument that acquiescence to Russian and Canadian 
jurisdictional assertions over the waterways benefits the international community 
at large. See Kraska, supra note 67, at 279. 
This view undervalues concerns among other maritime powers over the 
negative precedent for worldwide freedom of the seas arising from unilateral 
assertions of excessive claims. For the United States in particular, maintaining 
a stable regime that ensures global maritime maneuverability and mobility is 
considered a cornerstone of the nation’s economic and national security. 
Id. 
 79. See id. at 260. 
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addressing these issues (recall the development of the “Polar Code”) 
and is the best positioned international body to push for existing 
guidelines to become standard industry practice.80 Indeed, Russia 
was scheduled to participate in the IMO’s “voluntary audit scheme” 
in the fall of 2009, which gave the IMO an opportunity to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the state of Russia’s compliance with 
international standards.81 Russian participation in the audit is itself a 
positive sign that, at least with respect to commercial shipping, 
Russia is developing its Arctic policies under the auspices of the 
existing governance structure. 
More generally, the prospect of a completely ice-free Arctic Ocean 
contemplates heretofore unimaginable shipping routes, straight over 
the North Pole itself and substantially through “international waters” 
(although such a route would still require vessels to pass through the 
EEZs of one or more coastal states to reach the Arctic high seas). 
That possibility means that coastal state regulation alone cannot 
address the challenge of Arctic shipping. It also demands asking 
whether an ice-free Arctic Ocean should even be conceptualized as a 
unique regime, separate and apart from the high seas regime that 
applies everywhere else. Does the fact that an ice-free Arctic Ocean 
constitutes a “new space” for human movement require a new legal 
approach? The more that climate change renders the Arctic Ocean an 
ice-free zone separating the North American and Eurasian continents 
and exposes weaknesses in the current high seas regime, the more we 
should question why the focus is not on efforts to reform and 
improve the high seas regime generally, without special reference to 
the Arctic, and for the benefit of the oceans system on a global basis. 
C. FISHERIES 
Finally, climate change appears likely to soon make commercial 
fishing activity possible “within areas of the Arctic Ocean previously 
 
 80. See Young, supra note 2, at 75 (arguing that the guidelines need a 
significant amount of work to form the foundation of an “effective regulatory 
regime” for a potential increase in commercial shipping, but noting also that “this 
is the sort of challenge that . . . the IMO [is] relatively well prepared to handle”). 
 81. Russia is Ready to Participate in Voluntary IMO Member State Audit-
Transport Ministry, RZD-PARTNER, July 13, 2009, http://www.rzd-
partner.com/news/2009/07/13/342858.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2009). 
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protected from fishing by ice cover.”82 Fishing stocks are heading 
north as water temperatures increase.83 Illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing is a worldwide problem, and the Arctic is no 
exception.84  
The key international legal instrument for fisheries management is 
the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,85 an outgrowth of UNCLOS. The 
Fish Stocks Agreement facilitates coordination between coastal 
states and states with fishing vessels on the high seas to set and 
enforce catch limits with respect to “straddling stocks” or “highly 
migratory fish,” that is, fish populations that live in, or migrate 
between, more than one EEZ. Management is delegated to subsidiary 
bodies—Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
(“RFMOs”)—that handle the actual work of monitoring the catch, 
adjusting limits, and enforcing the rules.86  
Fisheries management is contentious everywhere, and there is no 
reason to expect that it will not be in the Arctic as well. Already, the 
Arctic periphery is subject to the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (in which Russia participates) in the case of Arctic cod 
and spring spawning herring in the Norwegian Sea and the 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea (to which both Russia and the 
United States are signatories).87 If these regimes can be expanded to 
address the opening of new fisheries in the Arctic, the member states 
should endeavor to do so.  
 
 82. HUEBERT & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 8 (identifying the potential increase 
in fishing activity as “[p]ossibly the greatest short- to medium-term threat to 
marine biodiversity”). 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. BURNETT ET AL., WWF, ILLEGAL FISHING IN ARCTIC WATERS: CATCH OF 
TODAY - GONE TOMORROW? 1 (Apr. 2008) (estimating worldwide economic losses 
associated with illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing at $15 billion per year). 
 85. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542.  
 86. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 36. 
 87. Young, supra note 2, at 75; see also BURNETT ET AL., supra note 84, at 9-
10 (noting that Norway and Russia also participate in a Joint Norwegian-Russian 
Fisheries Commission that manages the cod stock habitat straddling the two 
countries’ EEZs). 
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Another possibility is the creation of an RFMO for the Arctic. 
More narrowly tailored than a comprehensive, ecosystem-based 
treaty for the region (which would cover everything from fisheries 
and dumping, to polar bears and the rights of indigenous peoples), 
this is the kind of regional cooperation that is both sensible and 
politically feasible.88 Such an approach finds considerable precedent 
in the numerous RFMOs already up and running (with, admittedly, 
varied degrees of success). Because the individual EEZs of the 
Arctic coastal states do not provide complete coverage over the 
Arctic Ocean, the area of high seas beyond the EEZs will be 
susceptible to overfishing that will threaten stocks throughout the 
region. History has shown that fishing fleets act quickly to exploit 
such loopholes in the regulatory regime. Take, for example, the case 
of the so-called “donut hole” in the Central Bering Sea—an area of 
high seas completely surrounded by the EEZs of Russia and the 
United States.89 The failure of neighboring states to jointly manage 
the area led to rampant overfishing during the 1980s and the total 
collapse of stocks by 1992.90 Since then, the United States and Russia 
have jointly observed and enforced a moratorium on fishing in the 
area.91 Similar problems have plagued the so-called “loop hole” in 
the Barents Sea. 
 
 88. To this end, former President George W. Bush signed a joint resolution of 
the U.S. Congress that directs the United States to work with other nations on 
agreements for managing migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic 
Ocean. The resolution further requires the United States to support international 
efforts “to halt the expansion of commercial fishing activities in the high seas of 
the Arctic Ocean” until an appropriate RFMO can be established. See Pub. L. No. 
110-243, 122 Stat. 1569, 1570-71 (2008). The United States took an additional step 
towards this objective in August 2009 when the U.S. Department of Commerce 
approved the Arctic Fishery Management Plan, which will effectively “prohibit the 
expansion of commercial fishing in federal Arctic waters until researchers gather 
sufficient information on fish and the Arctic marine environment to prevent 
adverse impacts of commercial harvesting activity on the ecosystem.” See Press 
Release, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], Secretary of 
Commerce Gary Locke Approves Fisheries Plan for Arctic (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090820_arctic.html (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2009). 
 89. BURNETT ET AL., supra note 84, at 18. 
 90. Id. (specifying that three years earlier, various nations caught around 1.4 
million tons of fish from the donut hole, and stating that the fishery has not 
recovered from the resulting collapse). 
 91. Id. 
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Without venturing into the intricacies of how an RFMO for the 
Arctic Ocean might be established and operated, the point is that the 
United States, Russia, and the other Arctic states are familiar with 
the challenges of managing sustainable fisheries and the 
consequences of failing to act proactively. Furthermore, all eight 
Arctic states have ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement, a strong 
indication “that all eight states have already accepted the principles 
established by [UNCLOS] that includes the enforcement of regional 
fisheries agreements in the high seas.”92 In short, cooperation among 
the Arctic states, including Russia, seems more likely than conflict 
on fisheries issues. The real question may be whether those states 
allocate sufficient resources to the enforcement of whatever regime 
is put in place. 
CONCLUSION 
At the risk of oversimplifying these issues, this brief article has 
sought to provide a basic overview of the challenges facing the 
Arctic and the ways in which an existing legal framework already 
provides tools to address them. This does not mean the legal 
framework is adequate in every respect. But the existence of a 
sophisticated, multi-layered system of governance that extends to 
most, if not all, of the issues facing the Arctic strongly suggests that 
the way forward is not to sweep aside that structure in favor of 
something entirely new. Maritime delimitation disputes and the 
balance between coastal state control and the freedom of navigation 
are quintessential law of the sea issues. Furthermore, the need, for 
example, to prevent “bottom trawling” along the ocean floor or to 
promote and enforce vessel safety standards is not limited to the 
Arctic. And while the Arctic may require a new RFMO, other issues, 
such as standards for the construction of safe vessels or limitations 
on the transport of hazardous materials, are more appropriately 
handled on a global level. It makes little sense to spend political 
capital on a difficult and contentious project—a comprehensive 
treaty for the Arctic—that would unnecessarily isolate the region 
from the world’s oceans system as a whole.  
 
 
 92. HUEBERT & YEAGER, supra note 7, at 27. 
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Even efforts to create a “specific environmental regime for the 
Arctic”93 or to establish an international “polar park”94 should be 
viewed with caution. However well-intentioned it may be to promote 
a concept of “stewardship” for the Arctic, such approaches risk 
encouraging individual states or groups of states in other parts of the 
world to also declare “special regimes” that would subject other 
areas of the high seas to undesirable levels of coastal state 
interference.95 That risk should not preclude the discussion of 
feasible and lawful approaches to protecting the Arctic marine 
environment or achieving cooperative arrangements, but it should 
not be ignored either.  
Ultimately, rather than a potential conflict between Russia and its 
fellow Arctic states, the more realistic divergence of interests in the 
Arctic may lie between the circumpolar states and other interested 
parties from beyond the region (for example, China, Japan, or 
European Union members). Accordingly, to the extent the Arctic is 
to be treated differently, another consideration must be how to 
include non-Arctic states in the creation of any Arctic-specific 
regime that departs from the international standards that apply 
everywhere else. While this may create political headaches in the 
short-term, it is the better course for purposes of conflict prevention 
in the long-term. A starting point would be to grant non-Arctic states 
a more significant role in the activities of the Arctic Council.96  
Finally, is there a “Russian question” looming behind all of these 
issues? Whether we choose to proceed by strengthening and 
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extending the existing framework where we must, or to develop new 
solutions, will Russia choose to participate within that system? As 
noted at several points above, Russia, by and large, is already doing 
so. Moreover, Russian officials have been at pains to counteract the 
characterization of the Arctic described at the beginning of this 
article: the faulty notion of the Arctic as a future battleground 
between Russia and the West. For example, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry has publicly stated that discussion of “a possible military 
conflict for Arctic resources is baseless” and that the problems facing 
the region will be resolved “on the basis of international law.”97 Even 
the provocative figure at the head of Russia’s North Pole expedition 
has sought to downplay the situation, remarking that “[n]obody’s 
going to war with anybody” and that while Russia will “defend [its] 
economic interests . . . a conflict in the near future” is unlikely.98 
Moreover, the United States has largely acknowledged that Russia is 
adhering to the applicable rule of law, in particular with respect to 
the extended continental shelf.99 Simultaneously, Russia appears to 
be engaged with the international community when it comes to the 
Arctic: through the Arctic Council, through the IMO, and in bilateral 
and multilateral efforts with its fellow Arctic states.100 
At a minimum, Russia’s conduct in the Arctic appears broadly 
comparable to the conduct of other states with a presence in the 
region. Russia’s position on the Northern Sea Route may run afoul of 
international law to the extent it continues to impose burdensome 
requirements on prospective commercial shipping interests. Its 
position may become difficult to square with the relevant UNCLOS 
provisions and will also seem increasingly counterproductive with 
respect to developing the waterway’s commercial potential. But 
Russia’s position on this particular issue is generally consistent with 
that of Canada, the only other similarly-situated state (and not a state 
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that is frequently associated with lapses in adherence to rule of law 
principles). On continental shelf issues, Russia may be moving 
towards collaboration on a joint submission with Canada and 
Denmark. And on environmental and fisheries issues, Russia is at the 
bargaining table—again, at the Arctic Council, within various 
RFMOs, and elsewhere.  
On all of these fronts, there will continue to be opportunities to 
engage with Russia on collaborative solutions to the challenges 
facing the Arctic—problems that lend themselves to multilateral 
solutions. These opportunities to engage with Russia should be 
seized by the United States and others. By finding common ground 
in the Arctic, these efforts may have a positive byproduct: the 
improvement of relations with Russia in other spheres of conflict and 
areas of shared interest. 
 
